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abstract: Broad consensus exists in development studies that develop-
ment involves achieving and sustaining a so-called “good life.” Consider-
ably less agreement exists, however, as to what the goal of such a life 
consists in and what the best practices are for bringing such a life about. 
The varying and competing types of approaches to development cur-
rently on offer, including cultural-economic approaches, capabilities 
approaches, and happiness approaches, are the conceptual by-products 
of this discord. The impasse between these approaches owes in part to 
the vagueness and seeming incommensurability of value judgments. It 
owes in equal part to three common and interwoven tendencies when it 
comes to how values are approached in development theory and practice. 
These include: (1) the tendency to view values as fixed and final; (2) the 
tendency to formulate and evaluate means distinctly from ends; and (3) 
the tendency to equate the individual character of value experience with 
value subjectivism, though it is wholly compatible with value objectiv-
ism. The purpose of this paper is to critically analyze these value tenden-
cies while offering a theoretical reconstruction of each utilizing concep-
tual resources from philosophical pragmatism, especially John Dewey’s 
1 I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper which helped make its analysis clearer. Any remaining errors 
and oversights are my own.
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version. It is argued that, by adopting a more pragmatic approach to 
values, development theorists and practitioners can constructively move 
past the present impasse in development studies.
Keywords: development studies, John Dewey, pragmatism, theory 
vs. practice, value theory.
1. DeveloPMeNt aND axIoloGIcal aPrIorIsM
The role of values in shaping public affairs has garnered widespread 
attention since political scientist Samuel Huntington boldly forewarned 
of an imminent “clash of civilizations” (Huntington 1996). According 
to Huntington, the vast majority of global conflicts take place not along 
ideological or economic lines, as is widely argued to be the case; rather, 
they take place across various cultural “fault lines,” such as those (purport-
edly) separating Western and Islamic civilizations, to give a currently 
relevant example.2 Though compelling in its specificity, Huntington’s 
thesis has not been accepted without criticism. For instance, as several 
recent scholars have pointed out, it fails to acknowledge the significant 
diversity existing within cultures (Breidenbach and Pyíri 2009, p. 46) 
and, further, ignores the obvious fact that cultures are in constant dy-
namic interaction with each other and with legal, economic, political, and 
other factors (Cismas 2014, p. 4). Yet whether or not one accepts Hun-
tington’s view that social and political conflicts are basically contests over 
values, one can hardly deny that values play a part in determining human 
behavior. Skeptics on this point need only reference current events. Do-
ing so, one comes upon countless images of intolerance and violence 
alongside those of compassion and charity, but all invariably in the name 
of some values (religious, political, cultural, moral, etc.) or other. This 
ambivalent capacity of values for advancing or impeding human well-
being, as well as the crucial task of determining and promoting those 
values that conduce to the former, is a central –perhaps the central– con-
cern of development, the now global enterprise of “making a better life 
for everyone” (Peet and Hartwick 2009, p. 1).
2 The nine “civilizations” Huntington posits are: Western, Orthodox, Islamic, 
African, Latin American, Sinic, Hindu, Buddhist, and Japanese. See Huntington (1996) 
for a detailed presentation.
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Broad consensus exists in development studies that development, 
taken here to mean primarily human development, involves achieving 
and sustaining a so-called “good life”– what Nobel economist Amartya 
Sen has described, in short, as the kind of life one “has reason to value” 
(Sen 1999, p. 87). Considerably less agreement exists, however, as to 
what the goal of such a life consists in and what the best practices are for 
bringing such a life about. The varying and competing types of ap-
proaches to development currently on offer, including cultural-econom-
ic approaches, capabilities approaches, and happiness approaches, are 
the conceptual by-products of this discord. The impasse between these 
approaches owes in part to the vagueness and seeming incommensurabil-
ity of value judgments such as “good,” “right,” “true,” “beautiful,” and 
the like. It owes in equal part to three common and interwoven tenden-
cies when it comes to how values are approached in development theo-
ry and practice. These include: (1) the tendency to view values as fixed 
and final, though they are continually subject to review and revision; 
(2) the tendency to formulate and evaluate means distinctly from ends, 
though the two are at all times reciprocally determined; and (3) the 
tendency to equate the individual character of value experience with 
subjectivism about values, though it is wholly compatible with an ob-
jectivist stance.
These value tendencies indicate an underlying commitment in most 
formulations of development to what is best, if somewhat cumber-
somely, termed axiological apriorism. Axiological apriorism is the position 
that values exist apart from and are determined prior to experience (which 
is subsequently guided by them). At the same time, they attest to the 
positivism latent in virtually all fields of social evaluation and policy. 
While in its weaker, epistemological formulation, positivism’s search 
after empirical causes, effects, and rules is innocent enough, in its strong-
er, more metaphysical formulation, positivism sharply isolates such facts 
from the interests and values that give them shape and significance, frus-
trating concerns to bridge the two, as evidenced by intense debates sur-
rounding the validity and reliability of development indicators that aim 
past technical precision.3
3 A typical defense of the persistent reliance upon gross domestic product, or GDP, 
is the technical precision it affords, a byproduct of its purportedly value-free nature. 
Yet it is important to note that even GDP finds its origin and expression in value-
laden terms.
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Development indicators reflect distinct valuational judgments about 
what is constitutive of, that is, what is valuable for development. As such, 
indicators are at the center of ongoing and heated debates over develop-
ment’s proper content and assessment. If, on the one hand, development 
is understood to be a purely descriptive process, then technical and quan-
titative indicators are sufficient measures of development. On the other 
hand, if development is understood at all to be a prescriptive affair, then 
normative and qualitative indicators are clearly called for.4 The truth of 
the matter is that development, pithily defined by one development 
ethicist as “desirable social change” (Crocker 2008, p. 42), is a complex 
process with both descriptive and prescriptive components, a combination 
of facts and values best indicated by mixed methods.
A first step in clearing the ground for productive dialogue and col-
laboration among the varying approaches to human development involves 
taking full account of the experiential, relational, and instrumental, which 
is to say, “pragmatic”5 nature of facts and values alike. As the classical 
American pragmatists and especially John Dewey insisted, values only 
ever present themselves within the factual context of lived experience: as 
behavioral solutions to felt problems, as instrumental guides to desired 
goals, as satisfactions or “consummations” of experience (Dewey 1958, 
p. xi). Importantly, the pragmatic position should not be equated without 
4 GDP, for example, was designed as a measure of economic efficiency. Its insuf-
ficiency as an indicator of development meant in any broader sense is patent. Put 
simply, indicators are intended to indicate something that is deemed important for 
some reason or other. As such, they are inherently value-laden and are distinct from 
measurements. For example, capsaicin levels in Scoville heat units (SHUs) are adequate 
measures of piquance; they are not sufficient indicators of spiciness. That latter deter-
mination requires information over and above the quantitative facts of the matter–
namely, qualitative assessments of personal taste. For more on the important distinction 
between indicators and measurements, see McGranahan (1972). 
5 The terms “pragmatic” and “pragmatism” come from the Greek pragmata 
(singular: pragma), meaning “acts,” “deeds,” or “affairs”–basically everything with 
which one is occupied or toward which one shows concern. Pragmatism rejects as 
fundamentally wrongheaded the idea, held by philosophers since at least the time of 
Plato, that the function of thinking is simply to describe, represent, or “mirror” real-
ity, an idea implicitly contained in all correspondence theories of truth. Pragmatists 
argue instead that thought is better understood as an evolved product of the ongoing 
transaction between organism and environment as is lived experience in all of its non-
cognitive richness and variety. Lived experience admits of no impassable dualisms, 
guaranteed foundations, a priori regulative principles, or transcendental standpoints. 
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qualification with the position known as axiological phenomenalism. Just 
because values only ever present themselves within the qualitative struc-
tures of lived experience doesn’t mean that values have no existence apart 
from experience. As neopragmatist Hilary Putnam rightly reminds us, 
the values we experience are fundamentally “entangled” with the facts of 
physical reality; they are not at variance with them (Putnam 1993). 
Axiological positions that deem values epiphenomenal, as, say, emotive 
expressions in the Ayerian sense,6 or attempt to determine values aprior-
istically, ignore the real but experimental nature of all human values.
To some, theoretical concerns such as these seem loftily removed from 
those of development practice–intellectual relics of an ivory-tower analy-
sis out of touch with reality on the ground. Yet their resolutions are 
pressing. Conceptual uncertainty, as noted by feminist philosopher 
Martha Nussbaum, readily leads to policy choices that are just plain 
“wrong from the point of view of widely shared human values” (Nuss-
baum 2011, p. xi). Unpacking the pragmatic character of human values 
should assist planners and policymakers better identify the categories of 
value relevant for measuring development outcomes and shaping develop-
ment futures. The concerns of this paper thus form a necessary comple-
ment to recent work in development ethics and fit within the growing 
trend of acknowledging the relevance of philosophy to issues of develop-
ment policy.7 Though the paper itself makes no policy recommendations, 
it is hoped that its analysis will help clarify important and frequently 
misunderstood issues surrounding policy formation and evaluation.
2. DeveloPMeNt valuING aND valuatIoN
Development is fundamentally a proposition about values. While this 
may now seem obvious, there existed for a time (and, in some policymak-
ing circles, arguably still exists) a positivist strain in development thought 
6 It was British philosopher A. J. Ayer who, following the logical empiricists before 
him, declared value judgments to be neither true nor false because they do not assert 
anything, but rather express the feelings of the person making the judgment. Ayer’s 
position has proven widely influential in philosophical and non-philosophical circles 
alike. See Ayer (1952) for details, especially the first part of Chapter VI. 
7 See, for example, the arguments to this effect in Sen (1999), Crocker (2008), and 
Nussbaum (2000).
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that portrayed development as a quantitative, value-free process with 
purely economic goals and objectives. As ready-made plans for eco-
nomic take-off consistently failed to take root in lesser-developed countries, 
however, attention finally was called to development’s qualitative, value-
laden dimensions.8 While a theoretical advance over narrow economistic 
approaches, development initiatives concerned with values typically re-
main fixed toward commercial outcomes. Examples abound in the devel-
opment literature, for instance, of the qualities or values deemed most 
conducive to economic growth: “rational,” “scientific,” and “modern.” 
Such values are labeled by advocates and critics alike as Western and are 
often contrasted with the values they seek to challenge and even displace: 
“irrational,” “religious,” and “traditional”–values commonly designated, 
by mere contrast, as non-Western.
Assuming for a moment that this “West versus the rest” binary is 
meaningful, Western countries do enjoy economic living standards well 
above those of many non-Western countries.9 This goes too for those 
geographically non-Western countries largely influenced by Western 
modes of industrial production and political governance, such as Korea 
and Japan. According to some scholars, the responsibility for a country’s 
lack of development thus falls squarely upon the cultural beliefs and 
practices of its people. In other words, values, or what are better termed, 
highlighting their behavioral-dispositional nature and following Dewey’s 
terminology, “valuings” (Dewey 1939, p. 5) are to blame. Lawrence 
Harrison persuasively argued this point to explain Latin America’s seem-
ing inability to fully combat the internal forces of corruption and poor 
education that impede its social and economic progress, obstacles with 
which many countries of the region continue to struggle three decades 
later (Harrison 1985). More recently, it runs undercurrent to collabora-
tive work by Huntington and Harrison that explains the persistence of 
global divisions between rich and poor, between freedom and unfreedom, 
8 “Lesser developed countries” is used here in place of the now tired “third world 
countries,” although it too imperfectly circumscribes its content. As one scholar insight-
fully puts it: “All countries are ‘developing countries,’ although that phrase is sometimes 
used to refer to poorer countries: every nation has a lot of room for improvement in 
delivering an adequate quality of life to all its peoples” (Nussbaum 2011, p. x). 
9 In truth, postcolonial and hybridity theorists, mindful that no culture is static 
and immutable (a fact that Huntington’s analysis seems to ignore), provide us with 
good reason to abandon the Western/non-Western dichotomy. See, for example, the 
compelling argument put forth in Bhabha (1994).
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largely along cultural lines (Huntington and Harrison 2000). In the wake 
of the publication of this last work, a virtual cottage industry of cross-
cultural value studies has emerged that explores culture’s relation to 
subjects as diverse as leadership styles to the liberal arts.
The argument that “culture matters” is by no means novel; scholars 
have fallen back on the explanatory power of culture since Max Weber 
suggested the Protestant origins of capitalism (Weber 1958). And not 
only are cultural accounts for non-progress common, they are compelling, 
especially when considered in light of the failure of colonialism and de-
pendency theory to provide fully satisfactory explanations for underde-
velopment. Further, they lend themselves to empirical testing. One can, 
for instance, plot a country’s reported desires, interests, and habits–its 
valuings–as measured by the World Values Survey or other cross-nation-
al survey instrument (such as those collected in the Afrobarometer and 
Eurobarometer research projects) against its economic realities and iden-
tifiable patterns emerge. Employing this method, Jim Granato, Ronald 
Inglehart, and David Leblang uncovered that “achievement motivation” 
has a direct, positive effect on a country’s rate of economic growth (Gra-
nato, Inglehart, and Leblang 1996). Similarly, Christian Welzel, Ronald 
Inglehart, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann found societies that value “indi-
vidual resources,” “emancipative values,” and “freedom rights” rank 
highest in socioeconomic development worldwide (Welzel, Inglehart, and 
Klingemann 2003). By the same logic, economic inefficiency and back-
wardness is effectively explained by a culture’s lacking these values.
Economic approaches that incorporate considerations of culture provide 
important information that standard theory models of economic develop-
ment miss. Focusing on quantitative factors alone, standard models rein-
force a fact-value dichotomy that doesn’t hold up under scrutiny of even 
the most rigorous of scientific methods. As historian of science Thomas 
Kuhn revealed, even the natural sciences, after which standard theory 
economics patterns its impersonal, objectivist methodology, proceed only 
by the exercise of shared cognitive and aesthetic values, such as those that 
guide theory development and selection (Kuhn 1996). This is not to say 
that cultural-economic approaches to development are without limitation. 
It is rightly noted that such accounts demonstrate only correlations between 
culture and economy; they are unable to prove direct causal relations 
between the two. Similarly, as psychologist Jerome Bruner points out: 
culture without question shapes individual, including economic, choice; 
it is doubtful, however, that it wholly determines it (Bruner 1996). Ap-
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pealing in their simplicity, the monocausality of cultural-economic ap-
proaches to development begs the question. Other factors than cultural 
values, including geographical location and environmental makeup, play 
an obvious part in shaping not only the form of economic outcomes, but 
their very possibility (to mention nothing of their desirability). For post-
development thinkers, to endorse their logic smacks of a renewed Western 
ethnocentrism that again seeks to fashion worldwide modes of living 
through its own materialist and consumerist values.
Though rhetorically hyperbolic, the postdevelopment critique of 
cultural-economic approaches to development demands response. That 
response comes in the form of critical perspectives that temper naïve at-
tempts to separate a culture’s economically advantageous wheat from its 
economically disadvantageous chaff. Critical approaches to development, 
such as capabilities approaches and happiness approaches, recognize that 
some beliefs and practices are indeed better than others, but also recognize 
that such judgment requires sensitivity to context, to situational needs 
and resources, and thus can never be settled a priori in advance, much 
less settled against a single, fixed standard.
Sensitive to the paternalism inherent in any estimation or appraisal of 
a culture’s beliefs and practices, yet aware that reasoned deliberation of 
past valuings in light of their experienced consequences is a natural feature 
of human inquiry–in fact, one necessary for our continued survival–criti-
cal approaches to development are the end product of the process Dewey 
termed “valuation” (Dewey 1939, p. 5). Valuation is the evaluative process 
whereby our immediate, unreflective valuings, routinized as personal 
habits and cultural customs, are subject to reasoned and reflective assess-
ment. Valuation takes place when our desired beings and doings fail to 
prove desirable–to wit, at the moment our prior esteemed valuings become 
frustrated or harmful and require a choice, often vital, to be made–as when 
a sweets-loving person who develops insulin resistance must weigh her 
desire for good health against the besetting impulse to sate her sugar crav-
ings. In situations such as these, an immediately enjoyed habit is brought 
under reflective scrutiny in light of its negative future consequences and is 
transformed accordingly in effort to avoid those consequences.
Valuation likewise takes place at the collective (familial, societal, na-
tional, etc.) level. A clear case in point: the cultural practice of female 
circumcision is no longer swiftly dismissed as a customary or sacred rite 
of passage, but is increasingly recognized for the fundamental violation 
of bodily integrity and human rights that it is. The result of this collective 
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valuation has resulted in the practice’s growing international criminaliza-
tion (though enforcement in many countries leaves much to be desired) 
and its effective rebranding as female genital mutilation, a linguistic shift 
that is intended to facilitate a global behavioral-dispositional shift, name-
ly, the remaking of the valuings and valuations that enabled and habitu-
ated the practice in the first place. Such critical shifts in perception and 
practice are the very stuff by which positive social transformation and 
development occurs. Unfortunately, they are long coming and hard-won, 
owing to the extreme difficulty with which habit and custom are broken.
3. the coNtINuuM of DeveloPMeNt eNDs-MeaNs
The natural aim of all valuation, as the individual and collective exam-
ples illustrate, is the transformation of experience through the creation 
of better conduct-guiding valuings. There is an important but frequently 
ignored lesson here for development theory and practice–really, for all 
policy-oriented disciplines–and it is that values are in no sense plucked 
from a transcendent and acontextual source. Values emerge only and al-
ways within particular situations, as instruments for resolving the unset-
tled relations or felt imbalances–what Dewey simply but aptly called 
“problematic situations” (Dewey 1938, p. 35)–that arise time and again 
between humans (or other organisms) and their environments. Failure 
to recognize this fact time and again results in the promotion of prede-
termined values that, though viable in one context–say, treating natural 
resources as subservient to human comfort in an environment where they 
are plentiful–may very well prove disastrous in another–the very same 
behavior in an environment where mere survival is tied to resources that 
are scarce. As both the cause and effect of valuation, values are forever 
subject to criticism and revision relative to what is valuable, not simply 
what is valued, in the situation under consideration.
To be clear: values are not static and essential properties of objects 
waiting to be discovered, used, and exchanged. Such a position represents 
what could be called, in the spirit of Alfred North Whitehead, “the fal-
lacy of misplaced value.”10 It is precisely such mistaken belief that motivates 
10 Whitehead severely critiqued the innate human tendency toward reification, 
toward mistaking abstractions for concrete realities, which he influentially called “the 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness.” See Whitehead (2011), p. 66 for more information. 
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the search for fixed and objective measures of value, like those of com-
mercial worth or economic growth–a tendency widespread enough to 
account for the strong linguistic connection between “commodities” and 
“goods.” Rather, values are the hallmark of mature, intelligent behavior; 
they are hypotheses, experimental tools themselves to be tested, compared, 
and evaluated for their effectiveness in resolving problems and bringing 
about better states of affairs for individuals and society. And determina-
tions of this sort are best reached not by appeal to a priori standards, but 
by careful and continuous deliberation on means and ends.
The conventional treatment of means and ends begins first by 
sharply distinguishing the two. An end is considered that which is valu-
able in and of itself–an end is valued for its own sake. In axiological 
terms, ends have what is called “intrinsic value.” A mean, by contrast, 
is that which is valuable for the sake of something else. As such, means 
have “instrumental value” only. Put differently, ends are considered 
worthy aims or goals and means are but the “causal conditions employed 
to achieve intended ends–their value lies solely in their power to produce 
ends” (Waks 1999, p. 595). Contemporary approaches to development 
largely follow the conventional view. Cultural-economic approaches, 
for example, posit economic growth as the end of development; all 
other factors, including culture, are to be used (and evaluated for their 
effectiveness) in the course of that pursuit. They have no value save that 
conferred upon them as instruments of profit. Capabilities approaches, 
in reversal of the economic formula, assert that income is but one of 
several means to development’s true end of capabilities–basically, what 
a person is reasonably free to be and do (Sen 1999). Other, equally 
important means include life expectancy and educational achievement. 
In a similar fashion, happiness approaches argue that income is really 
nothing more than “an instrument in the service of human welfare” 
(Kesebir and Diener 2008, p. 61) conceived broadly as a state of per-
sonal fulfillment and subjective well-being. Subjective accounts of well-
being offer important information that objective accounts, which focus 
solely on material and physical needs, overlook.
The tendency to separate means and ends in this fashion–a tendency 
shared by cultural-economic approaches, capabilities approaches, and 
happiness approaches to development–is, from the vantage point of 
philosophical pragmatism, wrongheaded for two reasons. The first rea-
son is ethical. It is but a small step from the separation of means and ends 
to an “ends justify the means” mentality. Such an attitude leads only to 
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bad practice, as when the drive for increased happiness or education at 
the collective level turns a blind eye toward their unequal distribution 
among individuals, or when the fixation on economic growth by way 
of industrial output disregards the high transaction costs known as ex-
ternalities that material consumption incurs to the environment. The 
second reason the conventional separation of means from ends is mis-
guided is logical. Ends and means are in all cases reciprocally determined. 
As Dewey puts it: “ends are determinable only on the ground of the 
means that are involved in bringing them about” (Dewey 1939, p. 53). 
For instance, if obtaining a doctorate is one’s goal, one will have to 
complete a certain program of coursework, satisfactorily pass compre-
hensive examinations in the chosen field of study, and produce an 
original research project in the form of a dissertation. And once achieved, 
ends become means to future ends as a matter of course. With a doctor-
ate in hand, one can then apply for teaching positions at the collegiate 
or university level. Against the conventional view then, ends and means 
are better and more accurately viewed as a single unit, what Dewey called 
the “continuum of ends-means” (Dewey 1939, p. 40). To illustrate the 
point further by returning to an earlier example: the insulin-resistant 
person who desires good health views that goal necessarily in terms of 
the actions needed to achieve it–namely, the maintaining of stable blood 
sugar levels and the dietary habits this requires. Neither the maintenance 
of blood sugar levels nor good health are valued intrinsically, as ends-in-
themselves (even if casually spoken of in this fashion). Rather, both are 
valued instrumentally, as functional means to further ends, such as being 
able to undertake work, enjoy a full social life, and prevent premature 
mortality.
The point being made may seem so obvious as to not need mentioning. 
Yet it is entirely lost on approaches to development that isolate ends from 
means. The crux of the pragmatic reconstruction of the conventional 
means-ends dichotomy for development and other policy-oriented fields 
is that the process of ends-formation is never final. There are no ends-in-
themselves in a world marked by desire, novelty, and change. Ends are 
only ever what Dewey called “ends-in-view” (Dewey 1939, p. 40) that, 
when reached, become means to newly sought after ends. As such, ends-
in-view are subject to instrumental evaluation, as are all values, for their 
effectiveness in resolving the problematic situations that occasion them. In 
Dewey’s instrumentalist language, ends-means “are appraised or valued as 
good or bad on the ground of their serviceability” (Dewey 1939, p. 47).
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4. DeveloPMeNt as the exPerIeNce of oBJectIve value
To say that all values are instrumental is not to say that values are 
merely the product of human caprice or that they aim at practicality 
simpliciter–that is, at “what works” apart from serious considerations of 
consequence. Just such a criticism is frequently leveled against pragmatic 
approaches, as evidenced by the generally negative connotation of the 
term “pragmatic” in certain discursive circles.11 It is, however, rooted in 
misunderstanding. By all accounts, values are functional–What would it 
mean, besides linguistic confusion, to value an object, action, or event 
that carries no weight for how one lives one’s life?–but theirs is a practi-
cality secundum quid, one that aims ever toward progress and improve-
ment. This is what the word value, per its etymological roots, intends. 
The English value traces directly to the Latin valere: “to be strong,” “be 
worthy,” or “be well,” a rich meaning that is difficult to render in trans-
lation, but comes through in the epigram, attributed to the Latin poet 
Martial, Non est vivere, sed valere vita est: “Life is not merely living, 
but living well.” People do, of course, maintain values (at least as the word 
is used in everyday language) that carry no or negative weight for their 
lives, but such beliefs and practices are, for precisely this reason, better 
termed “non-values” or “disvalues,” respectively.
This is not to say that a pragmatic approach to values lays claim to 
know what should, or, for that matter, could be desired or valued in all 
cases (in fact, it is the unease which accompanies this impossibility that 
occasions the hanging on to prefixed values, even in cases where their ill 
effects are well known), but it does assert that many objects, actions, and 
events clearly aren’t desirable or valuable and that these are known di-
rectly by experience of their unsatisfactory consequences, by their failure 
to resolve the problem at hand, by their proving not strong, not worthy, 
and not well to those who bear them. As bluntly put by another major 
American pragmatist, C. I. Lewis: “Without the experience of felt value 
and disvalue, evaluations in general would have no meaning” (Lewis 1946, 
p. 375).
Likewise, those genuinely desirable and valuable objects, actions, and 
events are determinable only by experience of their satisfactory conse-
quences, by their ability to transform a problematic situation–marked by 
11 For a detailed treatment of what pragmatism intends by “practical,” see Dewey 
(1908).
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difficulty or uncertainty–into what Dewey called a “unified” one–marked, 
mutatis mutandis, by ease and security (Dewey 1938, p. 491). Except 
for the coin or currency collector, income alone offers little in direct 
contribution to “a life which would be found good in the living of it” 
(Lewis 1946, p. 395). Income in itself is a non-value of the good life. Only 
when income is met with the capabilities that enable its use does it become 
a potential value. And, further, only when those capabilities are exercised 
in a valuable way does either become an actual value, a felt increase in 
subjective well-being, and a genuine component of the good life–one 
punctuated by experiences of what Dewey termed, variously, “consum-
mation” (Dewey 1958, p. xi), “growth” (Dewey 1998, p. 104), and 
“development” (Dewey 2005, p. 82).
This seemingly innocent claim–that development must be experienced 
to be genuine–is open to charges of value (axiological) subjectivism. Put 
simply, value subjectivism is the position that no absolute, universal, or 
objective values exist. Rather, values are considered to be entirely relative 
to individual perspective, character, and interest. At first glance, this 
position is compelling, commonsensical even. It in principle guides our 
postmodern belief in the inviolability of personal conscience. It, too, 
implicitly undergirds development approaches rooted in axiological apri-
orism, wherein the validity of what counts as development depends upon 
the strict separation of objective and impersonal facts–those provided by 
economic theory, for instance–from subjective and personal values–sup-
plied, in turn, by culture and religion. Yet the fact of the matter is that, 
in the wake of positivism’s collapse, axiological apriorism is no longer a 
tenable position. This is especially so since the philosophical and scien-
tific turns to relationality. Recent advances in quantum physics, chaos 
and dynamic systems theories, and the cognitive sciences, for example, 
point to the natural world, dynamic and constantly evolving, as the ulti-
mate foundation of all human knowing which, by deduction, is intrinsi-
cally relational in some manner or other. Considerations of space preclude 
detailed presentation of the scientific advances alluded to here. For present 
purposes, it suffices to recognize their authoritative status as evidenced 
by consequent turns to naturalism and relationality in fields as diverse as 
literary theory, nursing research, psychotherapy, and theology (all of 
which take their lead from the antecedent scientific turn). What is im-
portant is that naturalism and relationality furnish attractive resources 
for an alternative framework for development theorizing. The claim that 
knowledge is relational calls attention to the fact that all knowledge implies 
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a relationship between the subject and object of knowledge, between a 
knower and the known, and that any item of knowledge makes sense 
only when placed alongside others that together establish its context, 
which, if not reducible to, are at least inseparable from nature.
Long before these scientific advances, John Dewey and the classical 
American pragmatists railed against all forms of apriorist thinking. At its 
base, pragmatism is a philosophy rooted in naturalistic and relational 
modes of experiencing, knowing, and valuing. Its axiological, as well as 
its epistemological and ontological, commitments are best summed up by 
Dewey’s conviction, rephrased by pragmatist scholar Larry Hickman, 
that “human beings are in and a part of nature, and not over against it” 
(Hickman 1996, p. 51). This fact imposes significant limits and constraints 
on the way we obtain, organize, and transmit knowledge, including 
knowledge of values. Nowhere do we find knowledge in a realm of ra-
tional, pure ideas existing apart from lived experience–from where eco-
nomic principles are often depicted as originating. Rather, it is through 
the reciprocal interaction between our physical sensate bodies and the 
larger natural and cultural environments in which we abide that we pri-
marily come to know and value the world. This holds radical implications 
for orthodox Western epistemology’s quest for truth with a capital “T.” 
Under the pragmatic theory, a proposition or ideology is true and valu-
able if the practical consequences of accepting it work satisfactorily, that 
is, if it helps one successfully navigate within and adapt to the conditions 
of his or her particular environmental niche. Pragmatist ontology is, by 
the same token, naturalistic and developmental. Ontological objects or 
beings are reconceived as environmental events of becoming, always 
undergoing processive transformation, with meanings and values accruing 
to them just insofar as they are capable of being perceived and engaged 
by appropriately skilled intentional agents.12
To sum up, then, pragmatic and relational axiologies, counter their 
apriorist rivals, recognize that values represent more than subjective 
12 The ontology outlined here can not be discussed in detail. It accords with that 
advanced in Putnam (2004), where the author convincingly argues that assertions of 
practical ethics (and, in this case, values more generally) can be intelligibly provided 
without a detailed defense of their ontology, as contemporary ontology strongly tends 
toward an eliminative “monism” by attempting to reduce the myriad of ethical and 
valuational concerns that arise in practice to just one sort of object that would (ideally) 
make statements about ethics and value true. 
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preferences; values correspond to objective properties and features of our 
natural and cultural environments. This is precisely what James Gibson, 
the founder of ecological psychology, had in mind with his innovative 
and frequently misunderstood notion of “affordances.” According to 
Gibson, the environment is far from a passive source of meaningless in-
formation–a position backed by behaviorist and cognitive psychologies 
that leave the task of meaning construction to our subjective mental activ-
ity alone. On the contrary, the environment actively broadcasts meaning-
ful, value-laden information that invites or “affords” opportunities for 
specific types of responsive behavior (Gibson 1966, p. 23). Careful 
consideration of this fact reveals the real challenge of development as one 
not of disclosing eternal, unchanging, and value-free facts, but of determin-
ing the contextual, adaptive, and valuable beliefs and behaviors for solving 
specific development problems.
Value subjectivism is frequently offered as sufficient reason for deny-
ing values any role, or granting them only an auxiliary role, in public 
affairs. Yet it merely reflects the recognition that external conditions of 
development must be met with internal conditions for its realization or 
its promises count for naught. This position is wholly compatible with 
(at least a certain form of) value objectivism. In fact, as we have seen, a 
truly pragmatic approach, which focuses on experience in its dynamic, 
multifaceted, and complex wholeness, cuts across the subject-object 
distinction in important and decisive ways. Such a recognition should 
grant values a properly constitutive role in public affairs, which aims 
ever at mutual understanding of common ideals and purposes–the very 
fabric from which values are woven. At the same time, it serves as a 
humble reminder that we’re often wrong, individually and collectively, 
about what is genuinely valuable for making our lives better. Only by 
open inquiry and reasoned deliberation can the genuinely valuable be 
discovered. Only through systematic training and education will the 
genuinely valuable also be desired. The objective value of this fact serves 
as a clarion call for renewed dialogue and active collaboration between 
cultural-economic approaches, capabilities approaches, and happiness 
approaches to development–all of which are essential for the genuine 
development of human “skills and powers, knowledge and appreciation, 
value and thought” (Hook 1959, p. 1013). Further, it forces perpetual 
reevaluation of the problematic situations in which we invariably find 
ourselves and, as a corollary, the ongoing refinement of the tools se-
lected for solving them, such as income, capability achievement, increased 
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happiness, as far as development is concerned. The point to be pressed 
is that the processes of problem reevaluation and tool refinement are, 
for natural organisms in a natural world, never final. As Dewey time 
and again reminds us:
This organic fact foreshadows learning and discovery, with the consequent 
outgrowth of new needs and new problematic situations. Inquiry, in settling 
the disturbed relation of organism-environment (which defines doubt) does not 
merely remove doubt by recurrence to a prior adaptive integration. It institutes 
new environing conditions that occasion new problems. What the organism 
learns during this process produces new powers that make new demands upon 
the environment. In short, as special problems are resolved, new ones tend to 
emerge. There is no such thing as a final settlement, because every settlement 
introduces the conditions of some degree of a new unsettling (Dewey 1938,  
p. 35).
Despite worries that it necessarily results in a pessimistic or nihilistic 
outlook, the humbling appreciation of our existence as natural creatures 
subject to constant environmental and social pressures should in no way 
be taken to undermine the foundations of our progressive endeavors. It 
does, however, recommend experiential, relational, and instrumental–in 
a word, “pragmatic”–approaches to those endeavors. Appreciation of this 
fact is hugely relevant for development planning and policymaking and 
hints at the promise of adopting a pragmatic approach to development 
values. Preparing development studies for this reconstructive task was the 
primary objective of this paper. In sketching the outlines of a pragmatic 
reconstruction of certain aspects of development theory, important 
groundwork has been laid for future synthetic work. Although not car-
ried to fruition presently (the synthesis of those insights and their impli-
cations will be no easy task), by recognizing the necessity of development’s 
positive reconstruction, the paper seeks to move past postdevelopment 
critiques that stop at the negative task of deconstruction.13 It is fully ex-
pected that the constructive recommendations offered will prove integral 
to the future establishment of a reflexive and pragmatic development 
framework capable of providing phenomenological traction for the in-
13 It is interesting and somewhat difficult to understand that such projects attempt 
to wield a subjugating power over any future attempt at subversion. This is a sin of 
hubris their Foucauldian “discourse is power” analyses should have rendered obsolete.
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trinsically maladroit process of development theory-to-practice translation. 
Recasting development theory and practice along pragmatic lines, how-
ever, demands our epistemological practices be adaptive and sustainable, 
our ontological categories remain fallible and flexible, and our axiological 
principles be determined and evaluated by means of experientially-
grounded heuristics. Further, it demands all of these concerns be formu-
lated with an eye toward engendering experiences and practices that strive 
to improve ecological–and not merely human–well-being. Surveying the 
varying extant approaches to development, it is manifestly apparent that 
such experiences and practices have not been sought or achieved with 
measurable success on a global scale. This realization serves as a novel 
explanation of development’s shortcomings and poses a unique and press-
ing challenge to future development work. This is a challenge and op-
portunity made not only to development theorists and practitioners, but 
to all of us. It is hoped we are up to the task.
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